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Norway. 1 Introduction
We have seen numerous base broadening and rate cutting tax reforms over the last
20 years. At the same time, the importance of corporations in the economy has in-
creased in several countries, as shown by Weichenrieder (2005) and Słrensen (2007).
Following Gordon and Slemrod (2000), what might seem as increased business ac-
tivity through an increasing number of corporations could in fact be the result of
tax reducing income shifting between the personal and corporate tax bases. Such
new corporations can be the result of tax induced shift in organizational form of
already existing businesses. In some cases, ￿rms are established with the sole pur-
pose of reducing tax payments of the owners. Income shifting through the choice
of organizational form is studied empirically by Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994),
Gentry (1994), Ayers et al. (1996), MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997), Goolsbee
(1998, 2004), Romanov (2006), Mooij and NicodŁme (2008), and Thoresen and Al-
stads￿ter (2008), and the conclusions are ambiguous, as discussed in section 2.
Under the Norwegian dual income tax system of 1992￿ 2005, corporations could
be taxed according to two di⁄erent tax regimes, depending on ownership constel-
lations.1 Corporations could shift tax regime at almost no transaction costs and
without a⁄ecting the relationship to creditors and employees. In contrast, a shift
between liable and non-liable organizational form may incur transition costs. We
analyze the full population of Norwegian corporations over the period 1993-2002; a
rich panel data set extracted from administrative registers with more than 800,000
observations of more than 140,000 corporations over a period of 10 years. Instead
of studying the e⁄ects of a tax reform on a ￿rm￿ s preferred choice of organizational
form, we evaluate the dynamic adaption to an existing tax system.
Our results show that corporations respond to tax incentives and change tax
regime in order to reduce tax payments. But even in our setting, with minimal
transition costs of changing tax regime, it seems like non-tax factors matter for
the choice of tax status. Corporation-speci￿c e⁄ects are substantial. We also ￿nd
that corporations founded prior to the 1992 tax reform di⁄er systematically from
corporations founded after the reform. This suggests that post-reform corporations
were more able to form tax reducing coalitions, compared to pre-reform corporations.
1In 2006, a dividend tax was introduced, and all corporations were then taxed according to the
same tax regime. See Słrensen (2005) for more on this.
2We also ￿nd that the probability of choosing a given tax regime is state dependent,
in the sense that this probability is clearly depending on the tax regime chosen in
the previous year.
Three contributions are likely to be applicable in more general cases. First; we
provide a practical theoretical framework for the analysis of tax induces income
shifting. We de￿ne terms such as tax reducing coalition, income shifting potential,
and tax regime potential. Second; we ￿nd evidence that suggest that corporations
founded prior to the 1992 reform have adapted systematically less well to the tax
system, compared to corporations founded after the reform. This may imply that
it will not be su¢ cient to observe a two-wave panel, with one pre-reform wave
and one post-reform wave, in order to measure the quantitative e⁄ects of a reform;
Cohort e⁄ects are persistent several years after the reform. And third; previous
empirical studies, usually based on short panels or cross sections, often use the
log-transformation of variables with skew distributions (such as assets, pro￿ts, or
number of employees), at the cost of excluding observations with zero values or
having to treat sub-samples with positive and negative values separately. In long
panels such practices become impractical, since a given corporation in some periods
belongs to one sub-sample and in other periods belongs to another. We overcome
these obstacles by applying a simple Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation
that reduce the in￿ uence of extreme values, positive as well as negative, and allows
the inclusion of observations with zero values.
2 Background
2.1 The Literature
An early empirical study of the e⁄ect of taxes on organizational form was conducted
by Ayers et al. (1996). The study was based on data from the U.S. in the period
1988-1989, following the 1986 tax reform, and found weak support to the hypoth-
esis that taxes a⁄ect businesses￿choice of organizational form, while state non-tax
factors seemed to dominate the choice. Gentry (1994), also on U.S. data, ￿nds that
business risk is an important determinant for the choice of organizational form with
di⁄erences in both liability and tax legislation. Based on aggregated shares of busi-
nesses in the corporate form for the U.S. in the period 1959-1986, MacKie-Mason and
3Gordon (1997) ￿nds relatively small tax e⁄ects on the choice of the corporate and
non-corporate organizational forms. This latter approach is replicated by Goolsbee
(1998) on U.S. data in the period 1900-1939, and the results indicate a small impact
of taxes. Goolsbee (2004) uses the same approach as Gordon and MacKie-Mason
(1994) on U.S. state level data for 1992. He has data on a large number of ￿rms in
the retail industry across U.S. states, which provides him with more variation in tax
rates. He ￿nds a large e⁄ect of taxes on the choice of organizational form.
In recent years, some contributions have been made on data from countries other
than the U.S.A. Romanov (2006) states that two changes of the Israeli dual income
tax regime spurred high-income professionals in certain industries to shift out of paid
employment and instead form one-man corporations in order to reduce tax payments.
Mooij and NicodŁme (2008) analyze panel data from 17 European countries and
conclude that there is substantial income shifting from the personal to the corporate
tax base through the choice of ￿rms￿organizational form. They suggest that 12%-
21% of corporate tax revenue may come from income shifting. Pirttil￿ and Selin
(2006) document an increase in taxable capital income of the Finnish self-employed
individuals after the introduction of dual income tax, interpreted as tax reducing
income shifting to the capital income tax base by the self-employed individuals.
Thoresen and Alstads￿ter (2008) ￿nd that owners of small Norwegian ￿rms that
shifted into the widely held corporate form had higher income growth than those
that remained in self-employment or as a closely held corporation.
Two theoretical contributions on the choice of organizational form under the
dual income tax are Lindhe et al. (2004) and Alstads￿ter (2007), and they provide
overview over the di⁄erent countries￿income splitting rules. The e⁄ects of the dual
income tax on related issues as taxable income, demand for debt and tax progres-
sivity are studied by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), Fj￿rli (2004), Fj￿rli and Lund
(2001), Thoresen (2004), and Lambert and Thoresen (2008) on Norwegian data.
Similar studies are conducted on Swedish data by SelØn (2002) and Hansson (2004).
Kari et al. (2008) studies the e⁄ects of an introduction of a Finnish dividend tax on
the ￿nancial policies of ￿rms operating under a dual income tax regime.
42.2 Details on the Norwegian tax system in the period 1992-
2004
The Norwegian tax system in the period 1992-2005 was a dual income tax system
that levied separate tax schedules on income from labor and capital.2 It combined
a low proportional tax rate on capital income with a progressive tax rate on labor
income. The corporate tax rate was the same as the capital income tax rate, and
there was no tax on dividends. Thus, for individuals in medium and high income
classes, there was a substantial di⁄erence in the marginal tax rates on capital and
labor income. At its peak, the di⁄erence in the top marginal tax rates on capital
and labor was 27.3 percentage points. This provided large incentives for income
shifting from labor income to capital income. As a countermeasure towards such
income shifting from the personal to the corporate tax base, the corporate tax system
included a system for imputing ￿for tax purposes only ￿the return to capital and
labor e⁄ort of the owners in corporations.
Thus, the Norwegian corporate tax system consisted of two distinct tax systems,
which we will refer to as the widely held regime and the closely held regime. A
corporation was de￿ned as closely held if 2/3 or more of the shares were held by active
owners. An owner was de￿ned as active if he worked more than 300 hours annually
in the corporation, and de￿ned as passive otherwise.3 A corporation was de￿ned as
widely held if less than 2/3 of the shares were held by active owners. For widely held
corporations, pro￿ts were taxed at the proportional tax rate and dividends to owners
were tax exempt. The same rules applied to closely held corporations, but in addition
an imputed return to labor was calculated and added to the active owners￿labor
income tax base. The imputed return to labor was business pro￿ts net of imputed
return to labor in the corporation, up to a threshold, and net of a salary deduction.4
The imputed return to capital was calculated by multiplying the value of the capital
assets by a ￿xed rate of return on capital, which during the period varied from 10%
to 16 %. If imputed labor income was negative, the loss did not o⁄set other income;
2For further details on the dual income tax, see Słrensen (1994, 2005) and Lindhe
et al. (2004).
3If active owners transferred ownership to their (passive) spouses or under-aged children, the
tax authorities would still regard the ownership as an active one.
4The salary deduction was for the broader part of the period 20% of the corporation￿ s total
wage costs.
5it could be carried forward and deducted against future imputed labor income in
the same ￿rm.The imputed return to labor was taxable regardless of whether or not
the owners had received payment from the corporations. Employers￿social security
contributions (the payroll tax) apply to all wage payments made by the corporation.
The contribution varies from 14.1 percent to zero according to regional zones.
3 Income shifting potential, tax regime shifting
potential, and tax reducing coalitions
Consider a corporation with concentrated ownership that generates a given annual
pro￿t. How can the owners receive the most of this pro￿t, after taxes? This is a
simultaneous tax minimization problem of income shifting and choice of tax regime.
Let us divide this into di⁄erent subproblems: First, for each tax regime, which is the
optimal wage-dividend scheme to the owners? Second, given the optimal solutions
for both tax regimes, which is the optimal regime? In this approach it is useful
to decompose the overall potential gain from these tax minimizing activities into
income shifting potential and the tax regime shifting potential. These concepts can be
compared with the more familiar concept of potential Pareto improvements, where
a policy change that makes the society as a whole better o⁄ can be considered as a
Pareto improvement as long as the individuals who gain can compensate the ones
who lose through a cash transfer.
To ￿x ideas, suppose the corporation is operating under the closely held tax
regime. The total payable tax will depend (among other things) on how much of
pro￿ts are distributed as dividends, on how much is paid as wage compensation to
the owners, and on their individual tax rates on labor income. If the owners simply
decide to pay wage compensation according to each owner￿ s actual labor e⁄ort, and
let the resulting pro￿ts be distributed as dividends according to ownership shares,
there will usually be left a potential Pareto improvement: If the owners agreed on a
di⁄erent wage-dividend scheme, the group as a whole could be made better o⁄; and
if they can agree on side-payments, they may all be made better o⁄. Similarly, the
owners could, in principle, choose a wage-dividend scheme that made them worse
o⁄. The di⁄erence between the best and the worst scheme within a tax regime,
6measured in after tax income, is what we de￿ne as the income shifting potential.5
Similarly, the owners could ￿nd the optimal wage-dividend scheme under the
widely held regime. The di⁄erence between optimal solutions in the two tax regimes
is what we de￿ne as tax regime shifting potential. If the tax regime shifting poten-
tial is non-zero, and the corporation is currently operating under the least favorable
regime, there exists potential Pareto improvements: An agreement, with side pay-
ments, between active and passive owners could make all parties better o⁄.
Let us refer to this type of coalition of owners as tax reducing coalitions. The
income shifting potential and regime shifting potential of a tax reducing coalition
exist even though they for various reason are not realizable. These are pure theo-
retical concepts intended to show how great the incentives for participating in tax
reducing activities are.
There are several examples of such tax reducing coalitions, where both legal
and illegal means are used to distribute tax savings amongst the participants. First,
if the passive owners are the active owner￿ s children over the age of 18, dividend
payments to passive owners will be tax exempt transfers within the family. The
active owner will then internalize this as his own income and automatically choose
the optimal wage-dividend scheme for the coalition. Second, two business owners
with similar income potential may swap ownership shares and be passive owners
in each other￿ s corporations in order to be classi￿ed as widely held corporations.
Third, a corporation may have pro-forma passive owners, where only part or none
of reported dividends are actually payed.
3.1 A stylized description of the two Norwegian tax regimes
In order to illustrate the income shifting incentives inherent under the Norwegian
dual income tax, we will now outline the main features in the two tax regimes in a
highly stylized situation. Later we use numerical examples to show how large these
income shifting incentives can be.
5A related phenomena is documented by Fj￿rli and Lund (2001). They analyze how owners of
corporations choose to pay wages and dividends during a transition period into the dual income
tax in Norway. They conclude that owners pay themselves more wages than optimal from a short
term tax reducing view, and suggest that this can be optimal from a long-term view, as wage
payments are the basis for future pension bene￿ts.
7Consider a corporation that is operative in a single year only, that has just
one active owner, and potential passive owners so that it is able to choose tax
regime. In order to focus on the income shifting aspect, we abstract from any real
decisions, such as production levels, investments, number of employees. We also
abstract from ownership composition and the price of their ownership shares that
the passive owners have to pay. The main objective is to show how much the tax
reducing coalition as a whole may save in taxes by engaging in the tax reducing
activities outlined above. How they then distribute their income amongst themselves
is uninteresting in this context. The advantage is that we only use variables that are
fully observable for the tax authorities.
Assume that there is a ￿xed net revenue in the corporation that is to be distrib-
uted to the active and passive owners in the coalition, either as wages to the active
owner, W, or dividends, D, to all owners. The main objective is to maximize total
after-tax income of the coalition as a whole. Any con￿ ict of interest between active
and passive owners are disregarded, or assumed perfectly solvable by side payments.
The after-tax income of the coalition as a whole is denoted Y , and is de￿ned by
Y = W + D ￿ [Tw(W + I) ￿ tcI] (1)
where the expression in the brackets constitutes the payable personal taxes of the
coalition. Here, Tw(:) ￿a piecewise linear, non-decreasing and continuous function
￿is the tax amount payable of the sum of wages and imputed return to labor, I,
and tc is the ￿ at capital tax rate. The imputed return to labor is only computed
by the tax authorities, not actually received by the individual. It is part of taxable
pro￿ts in the corporation. Thus, when labor income taxes due on imputed return
to labor on the personal are calculated, taxes paid on the corporate level tcI; are
deducted. This is also clear from equation (4). Dividends are tax exempt on the
owners￿hands.
The after tax-income depends on both how the corporate income is distributed
to its owner, and the tax regime. We will illuminate this by showing that D and
I can be replaced by simple functions of W. An intermediate de￿nition of pro￿ts
is useful, since pro￿ts a⁄ect both dividends and imputed return to labor. In this
context we therefore de￿ne the pro￿t of the corporation, ￿, as
￿ = R ￿ (1 + tp)W; ￿ ￿ 0; R ￿ 0 (2)
8where R is a ￿xed value of net revenue (total revenue less all costs other than owner￿ s
wage compensation), and tp is the payroll tax rate. In general, positive pro￿ts are
taxed at the ￿ at rate tc. The restriction requiring non-negative pro￿ts imposes an
upper bound on the owner￿ s wage compensation, W, thus the admitted interval for
W is:




In our setup all pro￿ts are distributed as dividends, D, which in turn can be
considered as a function of wages:
D = (1 ￿ tc)￿ = (1 ￿ tc)(R ￿ (1 + tp)W); D ￿ 0 (4)
The main di⁄erence between the closely held and the widely held tax regimes is
the imputed return to labor:
I =
(
0; if widely held
max[0;￿ ￿ I0 ￿ sW] = max[0;R ￿ I0 ￿ (1 + tp + s)W]; if closely held
(5)
where I0 is deductions due to imputed return to capital or salaries to employees other
than the active owner, and s is the salary deduction factor.6 In our one-year setup,
negative values of imputed return to labor will be disregarded, and only positive
values will in￿ uence the active owner￿ s after tax income.
Inserting for I and D in (1) we obtain expressions for the after tax income as
a function of the active owner￿ s wage compensation. In both tax regimes the after
tax income is a piecewise continuous function of W. In order to maximize after tax
income we need to check the end-point of the admitted interval for W and all point
where either of the tax regime-speci￿c functions have a kink.
3.2 Illustration by numerical examples
The main features of the Norwegian tax system can more easily be illustrated if
we impose a simplifying assumption: we disregard the progressive structure of the
6It is possible to increase I0 by increase the capital stock of the corporation, as described in
Alstads￿ter (2007). But as the stock of capital is disregarded in this stylized model, that will not
be an issue here.
9actual tax system and assume that there is a ￿xed tax rate on labor income. This is
expressed as Tw = tw ￿ (W + I), where tw ￿ tc is the constant tax rate. In this case
the after tax income for widely held corporations can be written as
Ywh(W) = (1 ￿ tc)R +
￿
(1 ￿ tw) ￿ (1 ￿ tc)(1 + tp)
￿
W; W ￿ 0 (6)
which is a simple linear function. For closely held corporations the after tax income
can be written as
Ych(W) =
(
Ywh(W) ￿ (tw ￿ tc)
￿
R ￿ I0 ￿ (1 + tp + s)W
￿
; if 0 ￿ W ￿ c W
Ywh(W); if W ￿ c W
(7)
where c W = (R ￿ I0)=(1 + tp + s). This function is piecewise linear with a kink for
W = c W. It follows from the assumptions that Ywh(0) ￿ Ych(0).
We ￿rst turn our attention to the income shifting potential. The derivatives with




wh(W) = ￿(tw ￿ tc) ￿ tp(1 ￿ tc); W ￿ 0; (8)
which implies that Ywh(0) ￿ Ywh(W). For a tax reducing coalition of owners of a
widely held corporation, it is optimal to pay zero wage to the active owner and
instead paying all pro￿ts as dividends. For a closely held corporation, the kink





(tw ￿ tc) ￿ tp(1 ￿ tw); if 0 ￿ W ￿ c W
Y 0
wh(W); if W ￿ c W
(9)
The derivative for closely held corporations can be positive for W ￿ c W, which
implies that Ych(c W) is the maximum; otherwise Ych(0) is the maximum.
After ￿nding the income shifting potential for each tax regime, we can then
calculate the tax regime shifting potential by comparing the maximum after tax
income across tax regimes. We will refer to Table 1 to illustrate. Since this table
is only intended for illustration purposes, the net revenue (before taxes and wage
payments to the active owner) is normalized to 100.
The left column of Table 1 lists the endpoints and kink-point for a corporation
with I0 = 0, which we can interpret at single-person corporation without capital
stock or employees. If this corporation is widely held and the owner￿ s wage is set
to zero, the after tax income will be 72, while if it set to its highest possible value
10Table 1: Numerical examples, eq. (6) and (7) for owners in high tax brackets. R =
100, tc = 0:28, s = 0:20, tw = 0:55, tp = 0:141
I0 = 0 I0 = 90
Ywh(0) 72.0 72.0
Ych(0) 45.0 69.3
Ywh(c W) = Ych(c W) 44.3 69.2
Ywh(W) = Ych(W) 39.4 39.4
Inc.shift.potential, WH 32.6 32.6
Inc.shift.potential, CH 5.6 29.9
Tax reg. shift potential 27.0 2.7
(W), the after tax income will be only 39.4. This means that the income shifting
potential is 32.6 under the widely held tax regime. In the closely held tax regime,
the income shifting potential is 5.6; the di⁄erence between the maximum value 45.0,
obtained when the owner￿ s wage is zero, and the minimum value 39.4, obtained when
the owner￿ s wage is at its highest value (W). The tax regime shifting potential is
thus 27.0, which is the di⁄erence between the maximum after tax income under the
widely held regime (72.0) and the maximum under the closely held regime (45.0).
The deductions due to imputed return to labor or salaries to employees other
than the active owner, I0, plays an important role. In the right column in Table 1
we have set I0 to 90, which can be interpreted as representing a corporation with
large capital stock or with several employees. Under the widely held tax regime, the
income shifting potential is una⁄ected by this deduction, but under the closely held
regime the income shifting potential has increased to 29.9. The tax regime shifting
potential is reduced correspondingly, to 2.7.
In this case the income shifting potential is large in both tax regimes, and the tax
regime potential is very low. Similar results are found by Thoresen and Alstads￿ter
(2008).
The size of the pay-roll tax (within the admitted interval between 0 and 14,1%)
can be shown to have little e⁄ect on both the income shifting potential and the tax
regime shifting potential. But the size of the marginal tax rate on labor income of
the active owner in the coalition has a great impact of the results. Both the income
shifting and the regime shifting potentials decrease as the marginal tax rate on labor
income is reduced. And this is what one would expect, as it is the di⁄erence in the
11marginal tax rates on labor and capital that drives this income shifting activity.
These are extreme results in a highly stylized model. In real life there will be
con￿ ict of interest between the active and passive owners in the coalition, as wage
payments to the active owner will be considered a cost by the passive owners, and
dividend payments to passive owners are considered a cost by the active owner.
So the actual potential tax savings are smaller in real life, but still expected to be
considerable.
4 Data and data transformations
Our main data source is the Corporate Accounting Register, which covers all non-
￿nancial Norwegian corporations. This register provides detailed information on
pro￿ts, equity, debt, capital, production costs, dividend payments, region and sector.
The second important source is the Tax Register, which provides information on
imputed return to labor ￿information that is necessary in order to identify which
corporations that are widely or closely held. In the two ￿rst years, 1993 and 1994,
and to a smaller degree 1995, a substantial share of the ￿rms lack identi￿cation
numbers and these were excluded from the analysis.
We included only observations where the tax regime in the previous year was
observed, we discarded corporations not operating within the seven largest indus-
tries, and we excluded observations with missing variables. Starting with 1,160,000
observations with valid identity numbers, these selection rules left us with more than
816,000 observations for more than 143,000 corporations over a period of 10 years.
4.1 De￿nition of variables
The variables Pro￿ts and Assets are de￿ned according to general accounting prin-
ciples and not the current tax code. Corporations are in tax position if Pro￿ts are
positive. Losses in previous years are deductible and reported values are net values,
after deduction of losses carried forward. Assets is used as a proxy to the actual
base for calculating imputed return to capital, as this is not available in the data.
The Payroll zone dummies divides all municipalities into ￿ve di⁄erent groups,
depending on the rate of payroll tax applicable in the municipality. The payroll tax
12rates varies from 14.8% (PAYROLL-1) to zero (PAYROLL-5). The highest rates are
imposed on relatively economically well-functioning city-like regions, while the lower
rates apply to less densely populated areas. Thus, these dummies can be regarded
also as measures of the degree of centrality for a ￿rm￿ s location. Data on the rates are
obtained from o¢ cial sources and merged with the register data using municipality
numbers.
Labor is the number of full-time equivalent employees. Foundation year is the
year the corporation was formed. Note that for ￿rms established as liable and later
incorporated, these dummies measures the year of incorporation, and not the year
of foundation. For the years 1993-1998, the foundation year is not fully available
on the original year-by-year ￿les. For corporations observed in later years, we have
imputed missing foundation years based on information available in the full panel.
Industry dummies are de￿ned using o¢ cial de￿nitions, in accordance to Euro-
stat￿ s NACE-standard.
4.2 Transformation of variables
Models with discrete dependent variables are in general sensitive toward observations
with extreme values of the independent variables. Several strategies can be chosen to
avoid problems stemming from highly in￿ uential extreme values, such as deleting or
manipulating the observations identi￿ed as problematic, or, as in the present study,
by transforming variables so that the distribution of all observations have a lesser
spread than the untransformed.
We have chosen to transform the variables Pro￿ts, Assets, and Labor by using
an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation (Johnson, 1949; Burbidge et al.,
1988):
g(x) = ln(x +
p
x2 + 1); (10)
where x denote an untransformed variable. This is a pragmatic choice. The main
reason is that, for the three variables in question, there are substantial numbers of
observations that take negative values or equals zero. The IHS-transformation can
handle any real number. In contrast, the more familiar log transformation cannot
handle non-positive values, while the Box-Cox transformation cannot handle zero
values (see Burbidge et al., 1988, for a more detailed comparison of these alternative
transformations). The IHS-transformation is monotonically increasing, symmetric
13around zero, since g(x) = ￿g(￿x), and converge toward ln(2jxj) for large values of
jxj.
The usefulness of the IHS transformation can be illustrated by the pro￿ts vari-
able: the distribution is shown in ￿gure 1. A similar ￿gure for the untransformed
pro￿ts yielded rather useless histograms with low resolution, due to the corporations
with large absolute values of pro￿ts. Applying the familiar log transformation would
require separate treatment of positive values, zeros, and negative values.
5 Logit models for the choice of tax regime
We present three di⁄erent logit models for the choice of tax regime. Model 1 is a
pooled model where the panel aspect is disregarded, while model 2 and 3 are random
e⁄ect logit models.
The three models will be presented in subsections 5.1 ￿5.3 where we discuss the
in￿ uence of pro￿ts and corporation speci￿c e⁄ects on the probability of being closely
held. In subsequent subsections discuss the in￿ uence of other explanatory factor for
all three models simultaneously.
All three models can be described in a common setup for the choice probabilities:








where zit = xit￿ + ￿i:
Here yit, equal to either zero or one, denote the observed choice of tax regime for
corporation i in observation year t. The regression part, zit, consists of a vector of
observable regressors, xit, a vector of coe¢ cients, ￿, and a corporation speci￿c un-
observed e⁄ect, ￿i. The list of regressors includes linear, quadratic and cross product
terms for pro￿ts, assets and number of employees, in addition to payroll tax zone-,
cohort-, time- and industry dummies ￿see Tables 2￿ 4 for details. The corporation
speci￿c e⁄ects capture unobserved time-invariant variables that a⁄ect a speci￿c cor-
poration￿ s choice of tax regime: In Model 1 these e⁄ects are disregarded, while in




14and stochastically independent of the observable regressors.
5.1 Pooled logit: Model 1
The estimation results for the pooled model, in which the panel data aspect of the
data is disregarded, are reported in Table 3.
The coe¢ cient for the squared values of IHS-transformed pro￿ts, (PROFITS)2,
is negative. This suggest that a the share of closely held corporations, conditional
on the other regressors, have a maximum and that deviations in pro￿ts from this
maximum reduces the probability of being closely held. As a general tendency this
is in accordance with the descriptive statistics given in Figure 1b.
The quadratic and cross product terms in the vector of regressors complicate
the interpretation of the estimated parameters. For this reason we have included a
graphs indicating the e⁄ect of pro￿ts on the estimated probability of being closely
held, see Figure 2. The left part of Figure 2 shows the predicted probability as a
function of transformed pro￿ts (PROFITS). In the chosen interval for the graph, this
function resembles a quadratic function with a single maximum and a symmetrical
shape. The right hand side of Figure 2 depicts the same functional relationship, but
in terms of untransformed pro￿ts (in 1000 NOK) and for positive pro￿ts only. The
graphs in Figure 2 indicate that large numerical values of pro￿ts have a tendency to
reduce the probability of choosing the closely held tax regime. Albeit all estimated
coe¢ cients related to pro￿ts are statistically signi￿cant, cf. Table 3, the e⁄ect of
pro￿ts on choice of tax regime is rather weak.
5.2 Static random e⁄ect logit: Model 2
In contrast to Model 1, which treats all observations as if they were drawn inde-
pendently, Model 2 accounts for individual heterogeneity by including corporation
speci￿c e⁄ects. These e⁄ects accounts for unobserved factors that that are ￿xed
(or changes little) during the years a corporation is included in the sample, such
as geographical location, and characteristics of the owners ￿say family or business
network that may a⁄ect the potential for forming tax reducing coalitions.
From Table 4 we ￿nd that the estimated standard deviation of the corporation
speci￿c e⁄ects, ￿￿, is 4.5664. This means that the corporation speci￿c e⁄ects are
15likely to be the single most important explanatory factor in Model 2. Figure 3
includes graphs for both Model 2 and Model 3, assuming that ￿i = 0 but otherwise
corresponding to the graphs for the pooled model presented in Figure 2. We will
comment on the graphs for Model 3 in the next subsection, but for now they can
serve the purpose of illustrating the in￿ uence of the corporation speci￿c e⁄ects.
Suppose we instead of setting ￿i = 0, we instead used the two values ￿i = ￿￿ and
￿i = ￿￿￿. Then the two resulting graphs would have been further apart than the
two graphs from Model 3 in Figure 3. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity
is a highly in￿ uential explanatory factor.
Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated coe¢ cient for (PROFITS)2 is positive,
suggesting that the probability for choosing the closely held tax regime has a mini-
mum point. In the graph in Figure 3 the minimum value is in the interval (-3, -2).
We will point out that even though this seems to contradict the results for Model
1 (and, as we will see later, also Model 3), this result is likely to be an artifact of
our model setup: The share of corporations choosing the closely held tax regime
follow neither a monotonic nor a quadratic pattern exactly, cf. Figure 1b. When
we impose a quadratic structure on this data, we must regard this as a simplifying
approximation. When we compare the graphs for Model 1 and Model 2 and view
them as predictions of probability levels, they seem relatively similar despite their
di⁄erent curvatures.
5.3 Dynamic random e⁄ect logit: Model 3
Models 1 and 2 are, formally, static models in the sense that previous choices tax
regime or previous values of the regressors are disregarded. The fact that most
corporations in the sample choose the same tax regime in all years or change regime
at most one time, suggests that observations of past choices is a strong predictor of
the current choice.
In Model 3 we have included a dummy indicating the choice of tax regime in the
previous year (yi;t￿1). Including this explanatory variable have a striking in￿ uence
on the estimate for ￿￿, which is only 0.19 (compared to 4.57 in Model 2). The lost
in￿ uence of the corporation speci￿c e⁄ects are instead captured by the coe¢ cient for
tax regime in the previous period. Its value, 4.5053, has a substantial in￿ uence on
the prediction of the probability of being closely held: In Figure 3, the only di⁄erence
16between the two graphs for Model 3 is the value of tax regime in the previous period.
5.4 Cohort e⁄ects
The choice of tax regime varies systematically between corporations founded in
di⁄erent years. Figure 4 shows the share of closely held corporations for four di⁄erent
cohorts, and how these shares develop over the observation period. The graphs for
two cohorts founded prior to the reform (1987 and 1989) are clearly below the two
cohorts founded after the 1992-reform (1993 and 1995). For all cohorts the share of
closely held corporations decreases from 1994 to 1999 and then ￿ attens out.
There are at least two explanations for this. First, there has been an in￿ ux of
already established ￿rms who incorporate in order to avoid the split model. Second,
newly established ￿rms are more able to form tax reducing coalitions, while existing
￿rms have to do with the existing owners.
In the three logit models, cohort dummies for the years 1986￿ 2001 are included.
This means that all cohort e⁄ects are measured relative to the group of corporations
founded in the year 1985 or earlier. In all three models there is a tendency that the
cohort e⁄ects shifts in coe¢ cient value, and/or z-ratio at the time of the 1992 tax
reform: Pre-reform e⁄ects tend to be either positive or insigni￿cant, indicating an
increased probability of being closely held, while post-reform e⁄ects are generally
negative and highly signi￿cant.
6 Conclusion.
We have presented a description of almost the entire population of Norwegian cor-
porations in the years 1993￿ 2003. Three logit models have been estimated in order
to model the choice of tax regime.
We have found that if the aim is to predict the probability that a speci￿c cor-
poration is closely held, the tax regime in the period prior to the prediction period
is more important than the level of pro￿ts: If we use the pooled model, our best
guess would be that the corporation in question would become widely held, and
that would turn out to be correct in slightly more than half the cases. If we instead
disregarded the model details and simply predicted that the tax regime in the next
17period would equal the last observed tax regime, we would get a correct prediction
in roughly 85 percent of the cases. If we only had pooled cross-section data available,
as would correspond to our model 1, this e⁄ect would be overlooked.
The high in￿ uence of corporation speci￿c e⁄ects in the panel data models, in-
dicate that future studies should focus on the owner characteristics of the corpora-
tions.
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PROFITS 2.539 5.631 IHS-transformed value of Profits
AKTIVA 8.111 2.041 IHS-transformed value of Aktiva
LABOR 1.449 1.418 IHS-transformed value of Labor
PROFITS^2 38.154 24.221 Squared values of PROFITS
AKTIVA^2 69.954 32.202 Squared values of AKTIVA
LABOR^2 4.109 6.223 Squared values of LABOR
PROFITS*AKTIVA 23.883 51.847 Product of PROFITS and AKTIVA
PAYROLL-1 0.813 0.390 Dummy for Payroll zone 1
... ...
PAYROLL-5 0.016 0.125 Dummy for Payroll zone 5
Y-1994 0.069 0.254 Dummy for Observation year 1994
... ...
Y-2002 0.128 0.334 Dummy for Observation year 2002
FY-1986 0.042 0.201 Dummy for Foundation year 1986
... ...
FY-2002 0.000 0.001 Dummy for foundation year 2002
NACE-D 0.113 0.316 Dummy for Manufacturing
NACE-F 0.096 0.294 Dummy for Construction
NACE-G 0.317 0.465 Dummy for Wholesale and retail sale...
NACE-I 0.066 0.248 Dummy for Transport, storage and communication
NACE-K 0.359 0.480 Dummy for Real estate, renting and business activities
NACE-N 0.019 0.137 Dummy for Health and social work
NACE-O 0.030 0.171 Dummy for Other community, social and personal
service activites
*) Only variables with names in uppercase are included in regressions. All dummy variables
have the value one if an observation meets the requirement indicated by the given definitions;
otherwise the value is zero. Some variables are ommitted in order to save space; this is
indicated by three dots.
21Table 3. Estimated coefficients in Model 1, pooled logit model for probability of being
closely held. N = 816263
Coeff. SE z-ratio
PROFITS^2 -0.0038 0.0002 -21.68
AKTIVA^2 -0.0354 0.0005 -74.34
PROFITS*AKTIVA 0.0048 0.0003 16.90
PROFITS -0.0246 0.0024 -10.12
AKTIVA 0.3600 0.0066 54.15
LABOR^2 -0.1724 0.0014 -120.80
LABOR 1.0232 0.0055 184.72
PAYROLL-2 0.0598 0.0085 7.06
PAYROLL-3 0.0110 0.0281 0.39
PAYROLL-4 0.0026 0.0095 0.27
PAYROLL-5 -0.2362 0.0195 -12.13
FY_1986 0.0465 0.0127 3.67
FY_1987 0.0466 0.0116 4.02
FY_1988 -0.0211 0.0118 -1.79
FY_1989 -0.0896 0.0111 -8.07
FY_1990 -0.1037 0.0113 -9.21
FY_1991 -0.1126 0.0115 -9.83
FY_1992 -0.3105 0.0116 -26.85
FY_1993 -0.2719 0.0114 -23.90
FY_1994 -0.2844 0.0114 -24.89
FY_1995 -0.3219 0.0120 -26.74
FY_1996 -0.3685 0.0119 -30.84
FY_1997 -0.4947 0.0123 -40.16
FY_1998 -0.4303 0.0126 -34.21
FY_1999 -0.4825 0.0193 -24.98
FY_2000 -0.4707 0.0227 -20.69
FY_2001 -0.3067 0.0357 -8.60
Y-1995 -0.1718 0.0121 -14.25
Y-1996 -0.2236 0.0119 -18.78
Y-1997 -0.4185 0.0118 -35.43
Y-1998 -0.4944 0.0117 -42.16
Y-1999 -0.5407 0.0117 -46.32
Y-2000 -0.4523 0.0117 -38.75
Y-2001 -0.4302 0.0118 -36.58
Y-2002 -0.4149 0.0119 -34.91
NACE-D 0.1427 0.0184 7.76
NACE-F 0.6852 0.0185 37.05
NACE-G 0.2861 0.0174 16.46
NACE-I -0.0446 0.0196 -2.28
NACE-K -0.1269 0.0175 -7.24
NACE-O -0.0128 0.0217 -0.59
CONSTANT -1.2065 0.0309 -39.05
22Table 4. Estimated parameters in Models 2 and 3; random effect logit models for the
probability of being closely held. N = 816 263
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff SE z-ratio Coeff SE z-ratio
CH_LASTYR
1) 4.5053 0.0085 530.13
PROFITS^2 0.0013 0.0004 3.42 -0.0030 0.0003 -10.71
AKTIVA^2 -0.0668 0.0012 -55.29 -0.0241 0.0007 -33.71
PROFITS*AKTIVA 0.0043 0.0005 7.89 0.0043 0.0004 10.00
PROFITS -0.0317 0.0047 -6.69 -0.0361 0.0037 -9.71
AKTIVA 0.8026 0.0165 48.66 0.2853 0.0100 28.68
LABOR^2 -0.2325 0.0040 -57.54 -0.1192 0.0022 -53.42
LABOR 1.3877 0.0154 90.23 0.7241 0.0091 79.37
PAYROLL-2 0.3307 0.0372 8.89 0.0154 0.0141 1.09
PAYROLL-3 0.1182 0.0737 1.60 -0.0605 0.0470 -1.29
PAYROLL-4 0.1054 0.0478 2.21 -0.0256 0.0156 -1.63
PAYROLL-5 -0.4392 0.1000 -4.39 -0.1328 0.0322 -4.13
FY_1986 0.3383 0.0755 4.48 0.0516 0.0210 2.46
FY_1987 0.3504 0.0689 5.08 0.0631 0.0193 3.27
FY_1988 0.2313 0.0701 3.30 0.0230 0.0196 1.17
FY_1989 0.0221 0.0657 0.34 0.0104 0.0184 0.56
FY_1990 0.0390 0.0666 0.59 0.0021 0.0187 0.12
FY_1991 -0.0557 0.0675 -0.83 0.0316 0.0190 1.66
FY_1992 -0.5924 0.0670 -8.84 -0.0747 0.0191 -3.91
FY_1993 -0.4133 0.0650 -6.36 -0.0212 0.0188 -1.13
FY_1994 -0.5045 0.0621 -8.13 -0.0509 0.0189 -2.70
FY_1995 -0.6447 0.0614 -10.51 -0.0607 0.0199 -3.06
FY_1996 -0.7734 0.0573 -13.50 -0.0449 0.0197 -2.27
FY_1997 -1.1119 0.0545 -20.40 -0.1171 0.0203 -5.78
FY_1998 -0.8340 0.0532 -15.68 0.0099 0.0206 0.48
FY_1999 -0.8609 0.0755 -11.40 -0.0196 0.0314 -0.62
FY_2000 -0.4741 0.0861 -5.51 -0.0811 0.0376 -2.16
FY_2001 0.1381 0.1225 1.13 -0.0451 0.0592 -0.76
Y-1995 -0.4179 0.0211 -19.83 -0.5773 0.0197 -29.28
Y-1996 -0.5713 0.0210 -27.20 -0.4056 0.0196 -20.75
Y-1997 -1.1990 0.0211 -56.88 -0.9031 0.0192 -46.94
Y-1998 -1.4719 0.0211 -69.80 -0.7011 0.0193 -36.42
Y-1999 -1.6448 0.0211 -77.77 -0.6494 0.0192 -33.81
Y-2000 -1.4443 0.0212 -68.26 -0.3665 0.0192 -19.13
Y-2001 -1.4149 0.0214 -66.18 -0.5020 0.0194 -25.88
Y-2002 -1.4007 0.0216 -64.76 -0.4998 0.0196 -25.47
NACE-D -0.1189 0.0943 -1.26 -0.1119 0.0305 -3.67
NACE-F 1.4799 0.0960 15.42 0.1664 0.0307 5.42
NACE-G 0.3715 0.0902 4.12 -0.0211 0.0288 -0.73
NACE-I -0.9047 0.0988 -9.16 -0.1760 0.0324 -5.43
NACE-K -1.2257 0.0897 -13.66 -0.1748 0.0290 -6.02
NACE-O -0.3758 0.1084 -3.47 -0.1780 0.0360 -4.94
CONSTANT -2.9286 0.1116 -26.25 -3.1051 0.0488 -63.65
Sigma_u 4.5664 0.0206 0.1906 0.0337
1) CH_LASTYR is a dummy variable, equal to one if the corporation was closely held last year, and equal to
zero otherwise.
23Figure 1. Distribution of IHS_Profits



























































Figure 1b. Share of closely held corporations, by values of IHS-Profits

























































24Figure 2. Predicted probability of being closely held as a function of IHS-profits (left) and
profits (right). Pooled model
1) In the predictions, AKTIVA and LABOR are set equal to their mean values, FY_1989 and
Y-2002 are set unity, while all other dummies are set to zero.
Figure 3. Predicted probability of being closely held as a function of IHS-profits (left)
and profits (right). Random effect logit models (Models 2 and 3)
1) Middle curves (red) represent predictions based on Model 2. Upper lines (tan) represents
predictions based on Model 3, for corporations that were closely held the previous year, while
lower lines (green) represent corporations that where widely held the previous year.
2) The predictions are calculated for the same values of explanatory variables as in Figure 2.
In addition it is assumed that 0 = i n .
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